Did Jack Johnson plot against Joe Louis?

[barry]

>>>>Its amazing, still no answer to my question. If the Mann act is so obscure then why does Johnson SELECTIVELY deserve a pardon over anyone else prosecuted by it? Why not issue pardons for EVERYONE prosecuted under this law?<<<<

I believe that I did answer exactly that in my last post. The Mann Act was passed to hamper the actual act of prostitution with intent to profit financially by crossing over state lines, which Johnson was not guilty of. Sure he took prostitutes over state lines, but it was for his personal pleasure and not for financial gain! I’d draw a picture if I had a notepad!


>>>>How ironic is it that many people here are claiming that Johnsons fame as a black man created the circumstances in which he was prosecuted and yet it is exactly his fame as a black man which are leading those interested parties to call for a pardon of him when there are others less guilty and yet less well known who go unnoticed by those who feel they are righting some moral injustice...<<<<

Personally, I could give a shit one way, or the other it doesn’t make any difference to me because Johnson is dead, but it’s easy to see the fact that he was wrongly convicted of the Mann Act, it’s as simple as adding and subtracting. Again, he is my answer to your response and the only area that I have been talking about in the argument. Johnson was wrongly convicted on charges pertaining to the Mann Act. The Mann Act itself was put forth to hinder the business of prostitution and those who benefited financially from that business. It was not made a law to stop consenting adults that randomly cross state lines on business, or pleasure trips from having sex in a hotel room…it was made a law to prosecute those who were in the business of prostitution for financial gain, which Johnson was not, but due to the fact that in the past “white America” had only been able to get Johnson for charges like speeding and other misdemeanors, which he nonchalantly and easily paid the fines for, the Mann Act was more serious and something that Johnson could not so easily buy his way out of and they intended to prosecute to the fullest existent of the law. Johnson was a pretty devious man and in the eyes of many he was guilty of having very, very low morals, but he was wrongly convicted on that particular occasion!

[robert.snell1]

Hi Barry

As you clearly have a fair bit of information on this event etc . Is it known who was behind the decision to prosecute him by the FBI . At present all which has been said gives no named persons .

Just curious - still think he was an idiot, which I hasten to add is not a good reason for locking people up (yet)

The next program was aired last night on BBC2 and should provoke some heated debate - less of a legal nature than this one. Just finished watching it and it does put a very bad light on the state of the Boxing setup in the US.

Jake and Liston dominated the majority of the show. The 2 Ali(Clay) v Liston fights are very strange. Did they put some chemical on the gloves ?

Was Ali faking the eye trouble - very good acting if he was. The knockout blow was interesting as they used a new technique to rotate the film footage to show where the blow landed, on the jaw, but from what i see it is odd he did not make the count.

The case put forward being it was the fault of the ref is quite convincing

well that should wind a few people up .....



Was Liston killed by the mob?

[barry]

White moralist leaders were behind Johnson's conviction. It was pushed by many and I do know that one of the men that questioned Johnson during the trial was Harry A. Parkin, U.S. Assistant D.A. Federal Judge Carpenter judged and sentenced Johnson in a Chicago court. I'll do some reading and try to find some leading names pushing for the, or for that matter any, convictions. Also, below are a couple of links to articles about Johnson and the Mann Act by Burt Sugar and Tom Donelson as well as a book, the only one that I know of, about the Mann Act law.

http://cyberboxingzone.com/boxing/w0403-td1.html
By Tom Donelson

http://www.eastsideboxing.com/news.php?p=1485&more=1
Bert Sugar

Crossing over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act
by David J. Langum

[robert.snell1]

Thanks very much Barry for all the information you provided. I had not read the second one.

It will be very interesting to find out more about those behind the prosecution and the motives etc. Johnson really was gift from Heaven for the white moralist - the KKK must have been rather pleased also.

It is also worth considering what his treatment , by the prison service, would have been like had he not done a runner. The nature of US prisons is not to be blunt a "Beacon of Light" regarding humane treatment.

On face value it looks like the people got their way - got rid of him - and when he returned they were satisfied with just locking him up for less time and not projecting him back into the public eye.

If this pardon issue is ever considered by the US it will be quite ironic as much of the world sees the current govt as very moralistic church based crowd. Odd twist of fate

[klompton]

The Mann Act was not passed solely for the purpose of limiting the interstate prostitution trade. It was passed in the same moralistic, intrusive fashion that Prohibition was passed ten years later as a means of regulating peoples personal lives via a conservative moral compass. Thats exactly why your argument fails, because taken out of context, yes Johnson looks like he was singled out, but when you look at it in the context of the times MANY of the people prosecuted under that law, if not most were done so under its looser interpretations. Which goes back to my question of why is Johnson so special other than his fame??? Simply stating that his crimes were for personal pleasure dont answer my question in the least because personal pleasure is exactly what the law makers had in mind when they wrote "IMMORAL PURPOSES" just like caminetti and diggs who were prosecuted for taking their girlfriends across state lines for a romantic weekend. Those didnt own a brothel and werent coverting with whores. That case alone defeats your anachronistic argument, among others. Its almost like saying that the laws against adultry arent in place to prevent consenting adults from engaging in sexual acts. WRONG. They are. You totally misinterpret both the entire law (which I question whether youve studied, or the times within in which it was written.)

[humanrobot]

I have only found evidence of TWO people being prosecuted under the law and it stuck only once.

[KOJOE90]

The 2 Ali(Clay) v Liston fights are very strange. Did they put some chemical on the gloves ?

Was Ali faking the eye trouble - very good acting if he was. ?

I taped the documentary and hope to watch it tonight. It was never proved that Liston had something on his gloves but two previous opponents of his, Eddie Machen and Zora Folley I believe made the same complaints about 'something getting in their eyes off Liston Gloves.

I believe Ali's vision problems in that fight were for real.

Was Liston killed by the mob?

Another toughie, in his early life I've read many times he worked as a heavy and strike breaker for the Mob. Apparently Liston and a 320lbs+ friend made a very threatening team.

As for Listons death, I know that he had had a terrible drink problem for years but never heard of any drug rumors. Liston had a terrible fear of needles so would he inject himself? Possible if drunk and depressed enough. Depression and drink can be a horrible combination.

I can't see Liston being injected by force, he was one of the most powerefull and dangerous Heavyweights ever. In his youth if the police went to arrest him I read they would need at least 6 officers to control him. Anyway there would have been signs of a struggle.

Charles 'Sonny ' Liston as far as I am awar is the only Heavyweight Champion in history not to have a verifiable date of birth and date of death.

[KOJOE90]

The knockout blow was interesting as they used a new technique to rotate the film footage to show where the blow landed, on the jaw, but from what i see it is odd he did not make the count.

The case put forward being it was the fault of the ref is quite convincing

This is a previous post of mine on this very subject.

I lean to the theory that it was a good sharp shot that caught Liston cold and/or by surprise.

Liston by this point was an old fighter with a big drink problem, whom had struggled for years and finally won the Title and guess what? Still nobody cared about him. He was the Heavyweight Champion of the World and he felt still nobody cared. That's bound to have an effect on a fighters spirit.

Liston was also in with a fighter who had the style to beat him every day of the week and I believe deep down Liston knew this to.

So when he got caught early I believe a mixture of shock, confusion over the count and Ali stood over him shouting and acting like a nut, Liston thought "sod it, nobody will care if I win anyway, so why take the chance of another beating".

Well that's my theory.

[klompton]

I have only found evidence of TWO people being prosecuted under the law and it stuck only once.

Considering your obvious agenda and your bias toward the "Johnson was a victim of society" argument its easy to see why you can only find two people, your not trying very hard.

How many people can you find who were prosecuted for adultery? Prohibition violation? etc etc.

A cursory internet search is unlikely to pull these types of records, go to a courthouse and start digging and youll find a lot more than you might think.

[humanrobot]

I have only found evidence of TWO people being prosecuted under the law and it stuck only once.

Considering your obvious agenda and your bias toward the "Johnson was a victim of society" argument its easy to see why you can only find two people, your not trying very hard.

How many people can you find who were prosecuted for adultery? Prohibition violation? etc etc.

A cursory internet search is unlikely to pull these types of records, go to a courthouse and start digging and youll find a lot more than you might think.

Apparently I am not the only one having difficult finding more info - the writers who have spent time researching this have not had much luck either. Hell, you are the only one that I have ever come across trying to sell this bullshit and you have not posted any facts to back up your opinion.

And as for bias.

Are you kidding me? You are calling ME biased ?

[barry]

Klomptom has a very hard time admiting that he is wrong, even when he seems to be the only person who has the view that he does and trying to enlighten him is light beating a dead horse! This I don't know and klompton should, but I'm pretty sure that Harry Greb transported women in the same manner, with the same intentions as Johnson, and I'm sure that there have been many more who the law never payed much mind to, why, because they were not black and flamboyant like Johnson. Johnson was singled out, and until you can provided some actual facts and they're sources, this argument is over...that usually puts an end to arguments because I have yet to see klompton post any actual facts about anything that I have argued with him about and when I quit responding to his opinions he has nothing else, but I would gladly swallow my words and admit that I am wrong for a little proof!

[klompton]

As a matter of fact Greb refrained for transporting women in such a manner. Why? His stated reason was he wanted to avoid a charge under the Mann Act... So goes your theory.


As for me not stating facts. Ive named several cases and could name more but nobody here arguing against me seems even remotely interested in facts.

[barry]

I haven't seen any of your facts, nor have I ever, ever heard, or read about anyone who would agree with you. I don't know of any boxing historian, or anyone else for that matter, unless it is someone from the kkk, who shares the same opinion on on Johnson and the Mann Act, doesn't that tell you something?

[Lausse]

Personally i find it perplexing as to why so many here are attacking Klompton for his criticism of Jack's pardon.All Klompton is saying is that if you are going to pardon someone who was convicted on a morally unjust and intrusive law to begin with then why not pardon all the other people who were also convicted of it?Why only pardon Johnson because he is a celebrity?The Mann act wasn't made just to take down Jack Johnson,it was a law that was selectively enforced but to say that it was created with the sole intent and purpose of putting Jack Johnson behind bars is nonsense.Yes he was singled out to an extent,but had he carried himself more like Joe Louis for example i am quite confident he would have never been prosecuted under any law.Johnson was a troublemaker who brought himself alot of grief with his behaviour,everything i have read about the man indicates that he was an asshole of monumental proportions who routinely brought trouble onto himself because of his desire to strike back and infuriate the white establishment of his day.

And if i am not mistaken he was disliked even by his own people for his boorish and uncouth behaviour.I say whoever goes out of their way to get negative press and attention shouldn't be surprised when people in positions of power take notice and try and take them down.Personally i don't even care about this whole pardon fiasco one way or the other,but if you are gonna pardon Jack who did everything he could to get negative attention in his day then you should also pardon the poor saps who drove over state lines with nothing more sinister in mind then having a good time with a ladyfriend.

[humanrobot]

As a matter of fact Greb refrained for transporting women in such a manner. Why? His stated reason was he wanted to avoid a charge under the Mann Act... So goes your theory.


As for me not stating facts. Ive named several cases and could name more but nobody here arguing against me seems even remotely interested in facts.

As a matter of fact, where are you getting your information about Greb? Please post a source - furthermore, post one about Jack Dempsey - I know that Dempsey dabbled in the skin trade, did he not ? It was common knowledge at the time.

You have not provided one iota of fact - only your opinion which is hard to take seriously because you are the only one on the planet saying these things.

[humanrobot]

Personally i find it perplexing as to why so many here are attacking Klompton for his criticism of Jack's pardon.All Klompton is saying is that if you are going to pardon someone who was convicted on a morally unjust and intrusive law to begin with then why not pardon all the other people who were also convicted of it?Why only pardon Johnson because he is a celebrity?The Mann act wasn't made just to take down Jack Johnson,it was a law that was selectively enforced but to say that it was created with the sole intent and purpose of putting Jack Johnson behind bars is nonsense.Yes he was singled out to an extent,but had he carried himself more like Joe Louis for example i am quite confident he would have never been prosecuted under any law.Johnson was a troublemaker who brought himself alot of grief with his behaviour,everything i have read about the man indicates that he was an asshole of monumental proportions who routinely brought trouble onto himself because of his desire to strike back and infuriate the white establishment of his day.

And if i am not mistaken he was disliked even by his own people for his boorish and uncouth behaviour.I say whoever goes out of their way to get negative press and attention shouldn't be surprised when people in positions of power take notice and try and take them down.Personally i don't even care about this whole pardon fiasco one way or the other,but if you are gonna pardon Jack who did everything he could to get negative attention in his day then you should also pardon the poor saps who drove over state lines with nothing more sinister in mind then having a good time with a ladyfriend.

In other words, be Black and do and act as you are told seems to be the gust of what you are saying. I don`t personally believe that Johnson did anything to personally garner negative attention. He was somewhat of a deviant - as were many men of the time - so Johnson, in my mind , was being a man and penalized because he happened to be Black.

As for pardoning everybody prosecuted under the Mann act - if you can find me a list of men who were then post it and I will personally send emails to whoever I have to in order to get the process of having these men pardoned .


btw - why do you think that he was "disliked by his own people" by this I don`t mean posting a quote of writers of the time. I mean give the reason as to why BLack people might be afraid of being associated with Johnson back in 1907.

[klompton]

Whats the point in listing facts when you ignore them? Ive already listed the names of two white men charged under the act for doing nothing more than crossing state lines for a romantic weekend with their girlfriends. You conveniently ignore that and continue to harp on my one question by stating that Im KKK or something.

As for Greb I think Im more of an authority on his comings and goings than anyone on this board including whoever writes those notes all over his record, many of which are so factually incorrect its ridiculous. Sorry but the Pittsburgh Post, as good as it was, was not the be all and end all to Grebs life. When my book on Greb comes out you can check the sources yourself but seeing as how you cant admit your wrong and show all of the signs of a last word hog then I assume you simply brush that aside as well.

Caminetti and Diggs await your letters to John McCain, Bert Sugar, Ken Burns and anyone else who thinks Jack Johnson was the only man convicted of the intrusive Mann act.

[Lausse]

Personally i find it perplexing as to why so many here are attacking Klompton for his criticism of Jack's pardon.All Klompton is saying is that if you are going to pardon someone who was convicted on a morally unjust and intrusive law to begin with then why not pardon all the other people who were also convicted of it?Why only pardon Johnson because he is a celebrity?The Mann act wasn't made just to take down Jack Johnson,it was a law that was selectively enforced but to say that it was created with the sole intent and purpose of putting Jack Johnson behind bars is nonsense.Yes he was singled out to an extent,but had he carried himself more like Joe Louis for example i am quite confident he would have never been prosecuted under any law.Johnson was a troublemaker who brought himself alot of grief with his behaviour,everything i have read about the man indicates that he was an asshole of monumental proportions who routinely brought trouble onto himself because of his desire to strike back and infuriate the white establishment of his day.

And if i am not mistaken he was disliked even by his own people for his boorish and uncouth behaviour.I say whoever goes out of their way to get negative press and attention shouldn't be surprised when people in positions of power take notice and try and take them down.Personally i don't even care about this whole pardon fiasco one way or the other,but if you are gonna pardon Jack who did everything he could to get negative attention in his day then you should also pardon the poor saps who drove over state lines with nothing more sinister in mind then having a good time with a ladyfriend.

In other words, be Black and do and act as you are told seems to be the gust of what you are saying. I don`t personally believe that Johnson did anything to personally garner negative attention. He was somewhat of a deviant - as were many men of the time - so Johnson, in my mind , was being a man and penalized because he happened to be Black.

As for pardoning everybody prosecuted under the Mann act - if you can find me a list of men who were then post it and I will personally send emails to whoever I have to in order to get the process of having these men pardoned .


btw - why do you think that he was "disliked by his own people" by this I don`t mean posting a quote of writers of the time. I mean give the reason as to why BLack people might be afraid of being associated with Johnson back in 1907.

Calm down there Kurt,what i am saying is that Jack knew full well that many of the things he said and did would bring him negative attention but he did them anyways.Jack was a troublemaker and he did it with glee,he loved nothing more then pissing off the white establishment so if you are gonna go out of your way to piss off people in positions of power then live with the consequences of your actions is all im saying.I don't give a rats ass about him fornicating white women,but he wasn't that stupid to not know that by doing that among other things he would definately piss off some powerful people who would try and take him down by any means.


As for pardoning all the people who were convicted under this Mann act i cannot provide you with any list of names for i am no historian and don't pretend to be.But i do agree with Klompton when he says if your gonna pardon Jack then pardon the other saps who were convicted under this same law,i don't see how that suddenly makes me part of the KKK.


"if i am not mistaken he was disliked even by his own people for his boorish and uncouth behaviour",notice how i clearly pointed out "if" i am not mistaken which i may be.I am positive i read this somewhere were other black people said that he gave a bad name and image to all blacks with his behaviour but i am not absolutely positive on this.But i do know for a fact that other prominent black fighters of his day weren't too high on him and his decision to draw the color line for his own people when it came to defending his crown against another black man.



Either way like i said i really couldn't care less about his pardon,i don't stay up at night trying to come up with a way to prevent it from happening.But i do agree with Klompton when he says that if your gonna pardon Jack Johnson then pardon the other men who were also convicted of this intrusive law.If some people here feel the need to accuse me of being a member of the KKK or some other white supremacist group because i share the same opinion as Klompton on this then all i have to say to them is .Not specifically talking about you Kurt but someone did make that comparison,Barry was his name i believe.

[humanrobot]

When did I say anything about the KKK???

[humanrobot]

Whats the point in listing facts when you ignore them? Ive already listed the names of two white men charged under the act for doing nothing more than crossing state lines for a romantic weekend with their girlfriends. You conveniently ignore that and continue to harp on my one question by stating that Im KKK or something.

As for Greb I think Im more of an authority on his comings and goings than anyone on this board including whoever writes those notes all over his record, many of which are so factually incorrect its ridiculous. Sorry but the Pittsburgh Post, as good as it was, was not the be all and end all to Grebs life. When my book on Greb comes out you can check the sources yourself but seeing as how you cant admit your wrong and show all of the signs of a last word hog then I assume you simply brush that aside as well.

Caminetti and Diggs await your letters to John McCain, Bert Sugar, Ken Burns and anyone else who thinks Jack Johnson was the only man convicted of the intrusive Mann act.

How can you be so obtuse and not to mention self-absorbed ? Does the term "extreme narcissim" mean anything to you?

It is you who seems to think that you know more than anyone on this matter. Fine, you provided a list of two men - I don`t believe that I claimed that Johnson was the ONLY ONE TRIED AND CONVICTED , however, if you are going to continue to deny that the racist US government was trying to make an example of Johnson by trying to find something, no matter how trivial, to pin on him then I don`t know what to tell you. Again - nobody claims that Johnson is the only one to have been tried and convicted by the Mann Act so let`s try and sticl the facts, the real facts and not the facts as you see them.

The fact that your big list contains three names is case and point that this law was not taken at all seriously in the grand scheme of things, period.


Calling Johnson a criminal because he went across statelines with a woman that he married is seriously pushing and although I have never mentioned the KKK I can see how somebody might mistake you for someone of that ilk. It`s funny taht you call Johnson a criminal for crossing the state lines with his future wife yet the two white guys Caminetti and Diggs who did it "for romantic weekends with their girlfriends" - that`s pretty convenient isn`t it. The white guys were on romantic weekends but Johnson , who married the lady he was with , is a criminal.

Incidentally, what makes your "facts" anymore factual then the ten or people on this thread stating theirs ?

[Lausse]

.Not specifically talking about you Kurt but someone did make that comparison,Barry was his name i believe

.

C'mon now i know it's you Kurt ,i guess you missed that part of my post.

[humanrobot]

.Not specifically talking about you Kurt but someone did make that comparison,Barry was his name i believe

.

C'mon now i know it's you Kurt ,i guess you missed that part of my post.

I must have - sorry man.


btw- ontroversyIn January 1911 he married Etta Duryea. But in September Etta committed suicide. Johnson, undefeatable in the ring, came under increasing external pressure - in June 1912 he was indicted for smuggling a diamond necklace and in October he was arrested under a section of the Mann Act The Mann Act of 1910 prohibited so-called white slavery - the practice of European girls working in American bordellos. It also banned the interstate transport of females for immoral purposes. Its primary intent was to address prostitution and immorality.

The Mann Act gets its name from James Robert Mann, an American lawmaker.

The first person prosecuted under the act was heavyweight boxing champion Jack Johnson, who encouraged a woman to leave a brothel and travel with him to another state. Though he later married the girl, and took her
..... Click the link for more information. , initially enacted to combat prostitution but never before used in prosecution, for transporting his fiancê, a white woman named Lucille Cameron, across state lines. Despite the looming trial he married Cameron in December 1912. He went to trial in Chicago in 1913 and on May 14 he was convicted and sentenced to a year and a day plus a fine of $1000.

In mid-June he fled the United States while free pending appeal. He continued fighting, mainly in exhibition bouts, but on April 5, 1915 the 37 year old lost his title to Jess Willard Jess Willard, born December 29, 1881 in St. Clere, Kansas on Pottawatamie Indian land in the United States - died December 15, 1968 in Los Angeles, California, was a heavyweight boxing champion.

A working cowboy, he did not begin boxing until he was almost thirty years old. In an era when racism was part of the American vernacular, Willard was dubbed as The Great White Hope, a reference to the desire to see the then African-American champion defeated.
..... Click the link for more information. in Havana. With a crowd of 25,000 for the scheduled 45 round fight Johnson was K.O.'d in the 26th round. He fought a number of bouts in Mexico before returning to the US on July 20, 1920 and surrendering to Federal agents. He was sent to Leavenworth to serve his sentence, released on July 9, 1921.

[humanrobot]

In any case - the so-called facts are wrong Klompy...they were tried between 1913 and 1917 "Caminetti and Diggs" so how could they be the first when Johnson was in 1912?

All of the evidence that I could find points to the fact that Johnson was the first man CONVICTED which is what people have been saying all along.

[klompton]

In any case - the so-called facts are wrong Klompy...they were tried between 1913 and 1917 "Caminetti and Diggs" so how could they be the first when Johnson was in 1912?

All of the evidence that I could find points to the fact that Johnson was the first man CONVICTED which is what people have been saying all along.

First off these are all quotes by you:

"I am not a politician or even an American for that matter"

So your presuming to understand better than a citizen of this country the socio-political nature of the times in question and the laws there in? Thats funny.

"The US government created that "law" in order to get something on him."
Despite the fact that you say you never said Johnson was the only one convicted this implies that some special consideration was given Johnson as opposed to the others convicted of the act and also implies a much more insidious campaign against him than the reality of the situation.

"And since when is travelling across statelines with your fiance/wife a crime despite what her colour is?"

Two points. 1. It wasnt Johnsons wife/fiance that he was travelling with. It was a whore. In fact he was charged with travelling with two different whores on two seperate occasions. The first was woman was compelled to marry Johnson because in our country a wife cannot be compelled to testify against her husband on trial. Nice and convenient way for Johnson to dodge that bullet. My second point and more to your question: "And since when is travelling across statelines with your fiance/wife (which its established she wasnt) a crime despite what her colour is? AFTER THE MANN ACT WAS PASSED!

Here are some more facts for you about prior case law leading up to the Johnson, Hays, Caminetti, Diggs and other trials which helped establish the Mann Act which as Ive stated previously is actually still in operation today in a modified form. I think it points very clearly that under the law Johnson was guilty even by the most strict interpretation and that he was neither the first, the last, or the most ill treated of those involved:


U.S. Supreme Court
CAMINETTI v. U S , 242 U.S. 470 (1917)
242 U.S. 470

F. DREW CAMINETTI, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 139.


MAURY I. DIGGS, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES.

No. 163.

L. T. HAYS, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES.

No. 464.

Nos. 139, 163, and 464.
Argued November 13 and 14, 1916
Decided January 15, 1917.



[242 U.S. 470, 472] Messrs. Joseph W. Bailey, Marshall B. Woodworth, and Robert T. Devlin for petitioners in Nos. 139 and 163.

[242 U.S. 470, 480] Mr. Harry O. Glasser for petitioner in No. 464.

[242 U.S. 470, 482] Assistant Attorney General Wallace for the United States.


Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

These three cases were argued together, and may be disposed of in a single opinion. In each of the cases there was a conviction and sentence for violation of the so-called White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910 ( 36 Stat. at L. 825, chap. 395, Comp. Stat. 1913, 8813), the judgments were affirmed by the circuit courts of appeals, and writs of certiorari bring the cases here.

In the Caminetti Case, the petitioner was indicted in the United States district court for the northern district of California, upon the 6th day of May, 1913, for alleged violations of the act. The indictment was in four counts, the first of which charged him with transporting and causing to be transported, and aiding and assisting in [242 U.S. 470, 483] obtaining transportation for a certain woman from Sacramento, California, to Reno, Nevada, in interstate commerce, for the purpose of debauchery, and for an immoral purpose, to wit, that the aforesaid woman should be and become his mistress and concubine. A verdict of not guilty was returned as to the other three counts of this indictment. As to the first count, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen months and to pay a fine of $1,500. Upon writ of error to the United States circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit, that judgment was affirmed. 136 C. C. A. 147, 220 Fed. 545.

Diggs was indicted at the same time as was Caminetti, upon six counts, with only four of which are we concerned, inasmuch as there was no verdict upon the last two. The first count charged the defendant with transporting and causing to be transported, and aiding and assisting in obtaining transportation for, a certain woman from Sacramento, California, to Reno, Nevada, for the purpose of debauchery, and for an immoral purpose, to wit, that the aforesaid woman should be and become his concubine and mistress. The second count charged him with a like offense as to another woman (the companion of Caminetti) in transportation, etc., from Sacramento to Reno, that she might become the mistress and concubine of Caminetti. The third count charged him (Diggs) with procuring a ticket for the first-mentioned woman from Sacramento to Reno in interstate commerce, with the intent that she should become his concubine and mistress. The fourth count made a like charge as to the girl companion of Caminetti. Upon trial and verdict of guilty on these four counts, he was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of $2,000. As in the Caminetti case, that judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 136 C. C. A. 147, 220 Fed. 545.

In the Hays Case, upon June 26th, 1914, an indictment [242 U.S. 470, 484] was returned in the United States district court for the western district of Oklahoma against Hays and another, charging violations of the act. The first count charged the said defendants with having, on March 17th, 1914, persuaded, induced, enticed, and coerced a certain woman, unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to the city of Wichita, Kansas, in interstate commerce and travel, for the purpose and with intent then and there to induce and coerce the said woman, and intending that she should be induced and coerced to engage in prostitution, debauchery, and other immoral practices, and did then and there, in furtherance of such purposes, procure and furnish a railway ticket entitling her to passage over the line of railway, to wit, the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway, and did then and there and thereby, knowingly entice and cause the said woman to go and to be carried and transported as a passenger in interstate commerce upon said line of railway. The second count charged that on the same date the defendants persuaded, induced, enticed, and coerced the same woman to be transported from Oklahoma City to Wichita, Kansas, with the purpose and intent to induce and coerce her to engage in prostitution, debauchery, and other immoral practices at and within the state of Kansas, and that they enticed her and caused her to go and be carried and transported as a passenger in interstate commerce from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to Wichita, Kansas, upon a line and route of a common carrier, to wit: The Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway. Defendants were found guilty by a jury upon both counts, and Hays was sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen months. Upon writ of error to the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, judgment was affirmed ( 145 C. C. A. 294, 231 Fed. 106).

It is contended that the act of Congress is intended to reach only 'commercialized vice,' or the traffic in women [242 U.S. 470, 485] for gain, and that the conduct for which the several petitioners were indicted and convicted, however reprehensible in morals, is not within the purview of the statute when properly construed in the light of its history and the purposes intended to be accomplished by its enactment. In none of the cases was it charged or proved that the transportation was for gain or for the purpose of furnishing women for prostitution for hire, and it is insisted that, such being the case, the acts charged and proved, upon which conviction was had, do not come within the statute.

It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 , 671 S., 32 L. ed. 1060, 1063, 1064, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33 , 39 S. L. ed. 601, 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. 232 U.S. 399, 409 , 58 S. L. ed. 658, 661, L.R.A.1915B, 774, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337; United States v. First Nat. Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 258 , 58 S. L. ed. 1298, 1303, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 846.

Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 , 44 S. L. ed. 219, 222, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155. There is no ambiguity in the terms of this act. It is specifically made an offense to knowingly transport or cause to be transported, etc., in interstate commerce, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for 'any other immoral purpose,' or with the intent and purpose to induce any such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice.

Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears, to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to [242 U.S. 470, 486] them. To cause a woman or girl to be transported for the purposes of debauchery, and for an immoral purpose, to wit, becoming a concubine or mistress, for which Caminetti and Diggs were convicted; or to transport an unmarried woman, under eighteen years of age, with the intent to induce her to engage in prostitution, debauchery, and other immoral practices, for which Hays was convicted, would seem by the very statement of the facts to embrace transportation for purposes denounced by the act, and therefore fairly within its meaning.

While such immoral purpose would be more culpable in morals and attributed to baser motives if accompanied with the expectation of pecuniary gain, such considerations do not prevent the lesser offense against morals of furnishing transportation in order that a woman may be debauched, or become a mistress or a concubine, from being the execution of purposes within the meaning of this law. To say the contrary would shock the common understanding of what constitutes an immoral purpose when those terms are applied, as here, to sexual relations.

In United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 , 52 L. ed. 543, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396, it was held that the act of Congress against the importation of alien women and girls for the purpose of prostitution 'and any other immoral purpose' included the importation of an alien woman to live in concubinage with the person importing her. In that case this court said:

'All will admit that full effect must be given to the intention of Congress as gathered from the words of the statute. There can be no doubt as to what class was aimed at by the clause forbidding the importation of alien women for purposes of 'prostitution.' It refers to women who, for hire or without hire, offer their bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with men. The lives and example of such persons are in hostility to 'the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one [242 U.S. 470, 487] man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political improvement.' Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 , 29 S. L. ed. 47, 57, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747. . . . Now the addition in the last statute of the words, 'or for any other immoral purpose,' after the word 'prostitution,' must have been made for some practical object. Those added words show beyond question that Congress had in view the protection of society against another class of alien women other than those who might be brought here merely for purposes of 'prostitution.' In forbidding the importation of alien women 'for any other immoral purpose,' Congress evidently thought that there were purposes in connection with the importations of alien women which, as in the case of importations for prostitution, were to be deemed immoral. It may be admitted that, in accordance with the familiar rule of ejusdem generis, the immoral purpose referred to by the words 'any other immoral purpose' must be one of the same general class or kind as the particular purpose of 'prostitution' specified in the same clause of the statute. 2 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 423, and authorities cited. But that rule cannot avail the accused in this case; for the immoral purpose charged in the indictment is of the same general class or kind as the one that controls in the importation of an alien woman for the purpose strictly of prostitution. The prostitute may, in the popular sense, be more degraded in character than the concubine, but the latter none the less must be held to lead an immoral life, if any regard whatever be had to the views that are almost universally held in this country as to the relations which may rightfully, from the standpoint of morality, exist between man and woman in the matter of sexual intercourse.'
This definition of an immoral purpose was given prior to the enactment of the act now under consideration, and [242 U.S. 470, 488] must be presumed to have been known to Congress when it enacted the law here involved. (See the sections of the act1 set forth in the margin.) [242 U.S. 470, 489] But it is contended that though the words are so plain that they cannot be misapprehended when given their usual and ordinary interpretation, and although the sections in which they appear do not in terms limit the offense defined and punished to acts of 'commercialized vice,' or the furnishing or procuring of transportation of women for debauchery, prostitution, or immoral practices for hire, such limited purpose is to be attributed to Congress and engrafted upon the act in view of the language of 8 and the report which accompanied the law upon its introduction into and subsequent passage by the House of Representatives.

In this connection, it may be observed that while the title of an act cannot overcome the meaning of plain and unambiguous words used in its body (United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386, 2 L. ed. 304, 313; Goodlett v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 122 U.S. 391, 408 , 30 S. L. ed. 1230, 1233, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1254; Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 172 , 47 S. L. ed. 1002, 1003, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821; Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 430 , 48 S. L. ed. 504, 509, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 92 , 58 S. L. ed. 515, 520, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196), the title of this act embraces the regulation of interstate commerce 'by prohibiting the transportation therein for immoral purposes of women and girls, and for other purposes.' It is true that [242 U.S. 470, 490] 8 of the act provides that it shall be known and referred to as the 'White Slave Traffic Act,' and the report accompanying the introduction of the same into the House of Representatives set forth the fact that a material portion of the legislation suggested was to meet conditions which had arisen in the past few years, and that the legislation was needed to put a stop to a villainous interstate and international traffic in women and girls. Still, the name given to an act by way of designation or description, or the report which accompanies it, cannot change the plain import of its words. If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is neither the duty nor the privilege of the courts to enter speculative fields in search of a different meaning.

Reports to Congress accompanying the introduction of proposed laws may aid the courts in reaching the true meaning of the legislature in cases of doubtful interpretation (Blake v. National City Bank, 23 Wall. 307, 319, 23 L. ed. 119, 120; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 42 , 39 S. L. ed. 601, 613, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; Chesapeake & P. Teleph. Co. v. Manning, 186 U.S. 238, 246 , 46 S. L. ed. 1144, 1147, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495 , 48 S. L. ed. 1087, 1090, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816). But, as we have already said, and it has been so often affirmed as to become a recognized rule, when words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations drawn from titles or designating names or reports accompanying their introduction, or from any extraneous source. In other words, the language being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 308 , 60 S. L. ed. 297, 300, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106.

The fact, if it be so, that the act as it is written opens the door to blackmailing operations upon a large scale, is no reason why the courts should refuse to enforce it according to its terms, if within the constitutional authority of Congress. Such considerations are more appropriately [242 U.S. 470, 491] ADDRESSED TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF THe government, which alone had authority to enact and may, if it sees fit, amend the law. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 673 , 32 L. ed. 1064, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651.

It is further insisted that a different construction of the act than is to be gathered from reading it is necessary in order to save it from constitutional objections, fatal to its validity. The act has its constitutional sanction in the power of Congress over interstate commerce. The broad character of that authority was declared once for all in the judgment pronounced by this court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23, and has since been steadily adhered to and applied to a variety of new conditions as they have arisen.

It may be conceded, for the purpose of the argument, that Congress has no power to punish one who travels in interstate commerce merely because he has the intention of committing an illegal or immoral act at the conclusion of the journey. But this act is not concerned with such instances. It seeks to reach and punish the movement in interstate commerce of women and girls with a view to the accomplishment of the unlawful purposes prohibited.

The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.

Moreover, this act has been sustained against objections affecting its constitutionality of the character now urged. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 , 57 L. ed. 523, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 906, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 905; Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326 , 57 L. ed. 528, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 911; Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 , 58 L. ed. 728, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 347. In the Hoke Case, the constitutional objections were given consideration and denied upon grounds fully stated in the opinion (pages 308 et seq.). It is true that the particular case arose from a prosecution of one charged with [242 U.S. 470, 492] transporting a woman for the purposes of prostitution in violation of the act. But, holding as we do, that the purposes and practices for which the transportation in these cases was procured are equally within the denunciation of the act, what was said in the Hoke Case as to the power of Congress over the subject is as applicable now as it was then.

After reviewing the Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames) 188 U.S. 321, 357 , 47 S. L. ed. 492, 501, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321, 13 Am. Crim. Rep. 561, and other cases in this court decided since the decision of that case, it was said in the Hoke Case (page 323):

'The principle established by the cases is the simple one, when rid of confusing and distracting considerations, that Congress has power over transportation 'among the several states;' that the power is complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to it, may adopt not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regulations. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 215 , 29 S. L. ed. 158, 166, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 856. We have no hesitation, therefore, in pronouncing the act of June 25, 1910, a legal exercise of the power of Congress.'
Notwithstanding this disposition of the questions concerning the construction and constitutionality of the act, certain of the questions made are of sufficient gravity to require further consideration.

In the Diggs Case, after referring to the fact that the defendant had taken the stand in his own behalf, and that his testimony differed somewhat from that of the girls who had testified in the case, and instructing the jury that it was their province to ascertain the truth of the matter, the court further said: 'After testifying to the relations between himself and Caminetti and these girls down to the Sunday night on which the evidence of the government tends to show the trip to Reno was taken, he stops short and has given none of the details or incidents of that trip nor any direct statement of the intent or purpose with [242 U.S. 470, 493] which that trip was taken, contenting himself by merely referring to it as having been taken, and by testifying to his state of mind for some days previous to the taking of that trip. Now this was the defendant's privilege, and, being a defendant, he could not be required to say more if he did not desire to do so; nor could he be cross-examined as to matters not covered by his direct testimony. But in passing upon the evidence in the case for the purpose of finding the facts you have a right to take this omission of the defendant into consideration. A defendant is not required under the law to take the witness stand. He cannot be compelled to testify at all, and if he fails to do so, no inference unfavorable to him may be drawn from that fact, nor is the prosecution permitted in that case to comment unfavorably upon the defendant's silence; but where a defendant elects to go upon the witness stand and testify, he then subjects himself to the same rule as that applying to any other witness, and if he has failed to deny or explain acts of an incriminating nature that the evidence of the prosecution tends to establish against him, such failure may not only be commented upon, but may be considered by the jury with all the other circumstances in reaching their conclusion as to his guilt or innocence; since it is a legitimate inference that, could he have truthfully denied or explained the incriminating evidence against him, he would have done so.'

This instruction, it is contended, was error in that it permitted the jury to draw inferences against the accused from failure to explain incriminating circumstances when it was within his power to do so, and thus operated to his prejudice and virtually made him a witness against himself, in derogation of rights secured by the 5th Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

There is a difference of opinion expressed in the cases upon this subject, the circuit court of appeals in the eighth circuit holding a contrary view, as also did the [242 U.S. 470, 494] circuit court of appeals in the first circuit. See Balliet v. United States, 64 C. C. A. 201, 129 Fed. 689; Myrick v. United States, 134 C. C. A. 619, 219 Fed. 1. We think the better reasoning supports the view sustained in the court of appeals in this case, which is that where the accused takes the stand in his own behalf and voluntarily testifies for himself (Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. at L. 30, chap. 37, Comp. Stat. 1913, 1465), he may not stop short in his testimony by omitting and failing to explain incriminating circumstances and events already in evidence, in which he participated and concerning which he is fully informed, without subjecting his silence to the inferences to be naturally drawn from it.

The accused, of all persons, had it within his power to meet, by his own account of the facts, the incriminating testimony of the girls. When he took the witness stand in his own behalf he voluntarily relinquished his privilege of silence, and ought not to be heard to speak alone of those things deemed to be for his interest, and be silent where he or his counsel regarded it for his interest to remain so, without the fair inference which would naturally spring from his speaking only of those things which would exculpate him and refraining to speak upon matters within his knowledge which might incriminate him. The instruction to the jury concerning the failure of the accused to explain acts of an incriminating nature which the evidence for the prosecution tended to establish against him, and the inference to be drawn from his silence, must be read in connection with the statement made in this part of the charge which clearly shows that the court was speaking with reference to the defendant's silence as to the trip to Reno with the girls named in the indictment, and as to the facts, circumstances, and intent with which that trip was taken; and the jury was told that it had a right to take into consideration that omission.

The court did not put upon the defendant the burden [242 U.S. 470, 495] of explaining every inculpatory fact shown or claimed to be established by the prosecution. The inference was to be drawn from the failure of the accused to meet evidence as to these matters within his own knowledge and as to events in which he was an active participant and fully able to speak when he voluntarily took the stand in his own behalf. We agree with the circuit court of appeals that it was the privilege of the trial court to call the attention of the jury in such manner as it did to this omission of the accused when he took the stand in his own behalf.

See, in this connection, Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 , 40 S. L. ed. 819, 821, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 369, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644; Sawyer v. United States, 202 U.S. 150 , 165; 50 L. ed. 972, 979, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575, 6 Ann. Cas. 269; Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314 , 56 S. L. ed. 448, 452, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281.

It is urged as a further ground of reversal of the judgments below that the trial court did not instruct the jury that the testimony of the two girls was that of accomplices, and to be received with great caution and believed only when corroborated by other testimony adduced in the case. We agree with the circuit court of appeals that the requests in the form made should not have been given. In Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 , 54 L. ed. 861, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 588, 19 Ann. Cas. 778, this court refused to reverse a judgment for failure to give an instruction of this general character, while saying that it was the better practice for courts to caution juries against too much reliance upon the testimony of accomplices, and to require corroborating testimony before giving credence to such evidence. While this is so, there is no absolute rule of law preventing convictions on the testimony of accomplices if juries believe them. 1 Bishop, Crim. Proc. 2d ed. 1081, and cases cited in the note.

Much is said about the character of the testimony adduced and as to certain facts tending to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused. This court does not weigh the evidence in a proceeding of this character, and it is enough to say that there was substantial testimony tending to support the verdicts rendered in the trial [242 U.S. 470, 496] courts. Other objections are urged upon our attention, but we find in none of them a sufficient reason for reversing the judgments of the Circuit Courts of Appeals in these cases.

The judgment in each of the cases is affirmed.

Mr. Justice McReynolds took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.


Mr. Justice McKenna, dissenting:

Undoubtedly, in the investigation of the meaning of a statute we resort first to its words, and, when clear, they are decisive. The principle has attractive and seemingly disposing simplicity, but that it is not easy of application, or, at least, encounters other principles, many cases demonstrate. The words of a statute may be uncertain in their signification or in their application. If the words be ambiguous, the problem they present is to be resolved by their definition; the subject matter and the lexicons become our guides. But here, even, we are not exempt from putting ourselves in the place of the legislators. If the words be clear in meaning, but the objects to which they are addressed be uncertain, the problem then is to determine the uncertainty. And for this a realization of conditions that provoked the statute must inform our judgment. Let us apply these observations to the present case.

The transportation which is made unlawful is of a woman or girl 'to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice.' Our present concern is with the words 'any other immoral practice,' which, it is asserted, have a special office. The words are clear enough as general descriptions; they fail in particular designation; they are class words, not specifications. Are they controlled by those which [242 U.S. 470, 497] precede them? If not, they are broader in generalization and include those that precede them, making them unnecessary and confusing. To what conclusion would this lead us? 'Immoral' is a very comprehensive word. It means a dereliction of morals. In such sense it covers every form of vice, every form of conduct that is contrary to good order. It will hardly be contended that in this sweeping sense it is used in the statute. But, if not used in such sense, to what is it limited and by what limited? If it be admitted that it is limited at all, that ends the imperative effect assigned to it in the opinion of the court. But not insisting quite on that, we ask again, By what is it limited? By its context, necessarily, and the purpose of the statute.

For the context I must refer to the statute; of the purpose of the statute Congress itself has given us illumination. It devotes a section to the declaration that the 'act shall be known and referred to as the 'White Slave Traffic Act." And its prominence gives it prevalence in the construction of the statute. It cannot be pushed aside or subordinated by indefinite words in other sentences, limited even there by the context. It is a peremptory rule of construction that all parts of a statute must be taken into account in ascertaining its meaning, and it cannot be said that 8 has no object. Even if it gives only a title to the act, it has especial weight. United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U.S. 72, 82 , 23 S. L. ed. 224, 229. But it gives more than a title; it makes distinctive the purpose of the statute. The designation 'white slave traffic' has the sufficiency of an axiom. If apprehended, there is no uncertainty as to the conduct it describes. It is commercialized vice, immoralities having a mercenary purpose, and this is confirmed by other circumstances.

The author of the bill was Mr. Mann, and in reporting it from the House committee on interstate and foreign commerce he declared for the committee that it was not [242 U.S. 470, 498] the purpose of the bill to interfere with or usurp in any way the police power of the states, and further, that it was not the intention of the bill to regulate prostitution or the places where prostitution or immorality was practised, which were said to be matters wholly within the power of the states, and over which the Federal government had no jurisdiction. And further explaining the bill, it was said that the sections of the act had been 'so drawn that they are limited to the cases in which there is an act of transportation in interstate commerce of women for the purposes of prostitution.' And again:

'The White Slave Trade.-A material portion of the legislation suggested and proposed is necessary to meet conditions which have arisen within the past few years. The legislation is needed to put a stop to a villainous interstate and international traffic in women and girls. The legislation is not needed or intended as an aid to the states in the exercise of their police powers in the suppression or regulation of immorality in general. It does not attempt to regulate the practice of voluntary prostitution, but aims solely to prevent panderers and procurers from compelling thousands of women and girls against their will and desire to enter and continue in a life of prostitution.' Cong. Rec. vol. 50, pp. 3368, 3370
In other words, it is vice as a business at which the law is directed, using interstate commerce as a facility to procure or distribute its victims.

In 1912 the sense of the Department of Justice was taken of the act in a case where a woman of twenty-four years went from Illinois, where she lived, to Minnesota, at the solicitation and expense of a man. She was there met by him and engaged with him in immoral practices like those for which petitioners were convicted. The assistant district attorney forwarded her statement to the Attorney General, with the comment that the element of traffic was absent from the [242 U.S. 470, 499] transaction and that therefore, in his opinion, it was not 'within the spirit and intent of the Mann Act.' 2 Replying, the Attorney General expressed his concurrence in the view of his subordinate. 3


Of course, neither the declarations of the report of the committee on interstate commerce of the House nor the opinion of the Attorney General are conclusive of the meaning of the law, but they are highly persuasive. The opinion was by one skilled in the rules and methods employed in the interpretation or construction of laws, and informed, besides, of the conditions to which the act was addressed. The report was by the committee charged with the duty of investigating the necessity for the act, and to inform the House of the results of that investigation, both of evil and remedy. The report of the committee has, therefore, a higher quality than debates on the floor of the House. The representations of the latter may indeed be ascribed to the exaggerations of advocacy or opposition. The report of a committee is the execution of a duty and has the sanction of duty. There is a presumption, therefore, that the measure it recommends has the purpose it teclares and will accomplish it as declared. [242 U.S. 470, 500] This being the purpose, the words of the statute should be construed to execute it, and they may be so construed even if their literal meaning be otherwise. In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 , 36 L. ed. 226, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511, there came to this court for construction an act of Congress which made it unlawful for anyone in any of the United States 'to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States . . . under contract or agreement . . . to perform labor or service of any kind [italics mine] in the United States, its territories or the District of Columbia.' The Trinity Church made a contract with one E. W. Warren, a resident of England, to remove to the city of New York and enter its service as rector and pastor. The church was proceeded against under the act and the circuit court held that it applied, and rendered judgment accordingly. 36 Fed. 303.

It will be observed that the language of the statute is very comprehensive,-fully as much so as the language of the act under review,- having no limitation whatever from the context; and the circuit court, in submission to what the court considered its imperative quality, rendered judgment against the church. This court reversed the judgment, and, in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, declared that 'it is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' And the learned justice further said: 'This has been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application.'

It is hardly necessary to say that the application of the rule does not depend upon the objects of the legislation, to be applied or not applied as it may exclude or include good things or bad things. Its principle is the simple one that the words of a statute will be extended or restricted to execute its purpose. [242 U.S. 470, 501] Another pertinent illustration of the rule is Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162, 20 L. ed. 566, in which the court declared that if at times it was its duty to regard the words of a statute, at times it was also its duty to disregard them, limit or extend them, in order to execute the purpose of the statute. And applying the principle, it decided that in a tariff act the provision that a duty should be imposed on horses, etc., and other live animals imported from foreign countries should not include canary birds, ignoring the classification of nature. And so again in Silver v. Ladd, 7 Wall. 219, 19 L. ed. 138, where the benefit of the Oregon Donation Act was extended by making the words 'single man' used in the statute mean an unmarried woman, disregarding a difference of genders clearly expressed in the law.

The rule that these cases illustrate is a valuable one and in varying degrees has daily practice. It not only rescues legislation from absurdity ( so far the opinion of the court admits its application), but it often rescues it from invalidity,-a useful result in our dual form of governments and conflicting jurisdictions. It is the dictate of common sense. Language, even when most masterfully used, may miss sufficiency and give room for dispute. Is it a wonder, therefore, that when used in the haste of legislation, in view of conditions perhaps only partly seen or not seen at all, the consequences, it may be, beyond present foresight, it often becomes necessary to apply the rule? And it is a rule of prudence and highest sense. It rescues from crudities, excesses, and deficiencies, making legislation adequate to its special purpose, rendering unnecessary repeated qualifications, and leaving the simple and best exposition of a law the mischief it was intended to redress. Nor is this judicial legislation. It is seeking and enforcing the true sense of a law notwithstanding its imperfection or generality of expression.

There is much in the present case to tempt to a violation of the rule. Any measure that protects the purity of [242 U.S. 470, 502] women from assault or enticement to degradation finds an instant advocate in our best emotions; but the judicial function cannot yield to emotion-it must, with poise of mind, consider and decide. It should not shut its eyes to the facts of the world and assume not to know what everybody else knows. And everybody knows that there is a difference between the occasional immoralities of men and women and that syatematized and mercenary immorality epitomized in the statute's graphic phrase 'white slave traffic.' And it was such immorality that was in the legislative mind, and not the other. The other is occasional, not habitual,-inconspicuous,-does not offensively obtrude upon public notice. Interstate commerce is not its instrument as it is of the other, nor is prostitution its object or its end. It may, indeed, in instances, find a convenience in crossing state lines, but this is its accident, not its aid.

There is danger in extending a statute beyond its purpose, even if justified by a strict adherence to its words. The purpose is studied, all effects measured, not left at random,-one evil practice prevented, opportunity given to another. The present case warns against ascribing such improvidence to the statute under review. Blackmailers of both sexes have arisen, using the terrors of the construction now sanctioned by this court as a help-indeed, the means-for their brigandage. The result is grave and should give us pause. It certainly will not be denied that legal authority justifies the rejection of a construction which leads to mischievous consequences, if the statute be susceptible of another construction.

United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 52 L. ed. 543, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396, is not in opposition. The statute passed upon was a prohibition against the importation of alien women or girls,-a statute, therefore, of broader purpose than the one under review. Besides, the statute finally passed upon was an amendment to a prior statute, and the words construed were an addition to the [242 U.S. 470, 503] prior statute, and necessarily, therefore, had an added effect. The first statute prohibited the importation of any alien woman or girl into the United States for the purpose of prostitution [italics mine]. The second statute repeated the words and added 'or for any other immoral purpose.' Necessarily there was an enlargement of purpose, and besides, the act was directed against the importation of foreign corruption, and was construed accordingly. The case, therefore, does not contradict the rule; it is an example of it.

For these reasons I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court, expressing no opinion of the other propositions in the cases.

I am authorized to say that the CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice Clarke concur in this dissent.

Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act are as follows:

'Sec. 2. That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or the District of Columbia, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
'Sec. 3. That any person who shall knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, or cause to be persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced, or aid or assist in persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing any woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory or the District of Columbia, for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose on the part of such person that such woman or girl shall engage in the practice of prostitution or debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whether with or without her consent, and who shall thereby knowingly cause or aid or assist in causing such woman or girl to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers in interstate or foreign commerce, or any territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
'Sec. 4. That any person who shall knowingly persuade, induce, entice or coerce any woman or girl under the age of eighteen years, from any state or territory or the District of Columbia, to any other state or territory or the District of Columbia, with the purpose and intent to induce or coerce her, or that she shall be induced or coerced to engage in prostitution or debauchery, or any other immoral practice, and shall in furtherance of such purpose knowingly induce or cause her to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger in interstate commerce upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.'

[ Footnote 2 ] 'Careful consideration of the facts and circumstances as related by Miss Cox fails to convince me that her case came within the spirit and intent of the Mann act. The element of traffic is entirely absent from this transaction. It is not a case of prostitution or debauchery and the general words 'or other immoral practice' should be qualified by the particular preceding words and be read in the light of the rule of ejusdem generis. This view of the statute is the more reasonable when considered in connection with 8, where Congress employs the terms 'slave' and 'traffic' as indicative of its purpose to suppress certain forms of abominable practice connected with the degradation of women for gain.'

[ Footnote 3 ] 'I agree with your conclusion that the facts and circumstances set forth in your letter and its inclosure do not bring the matter within the true intent of the White Slave Traffic Act, and that no prosecution against Edwards should be instituted in the Federal courts unless other and different facts are presented to you.'

[klompton]

A little more knowledge for you so you can make an educated argument next time. This will explain much of the motivation for the Mann Act (it wasnt Johnson) and how it was used in such an intrusive fashion across the board, not just with Johnson. Note the first sentence ALTHOUGH MANY OF THE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE CONVICTED UNDER THE ACT...

"Although many
of the thousands of people convicted under the act were no angels, it
was a badly drafted law. Enacted to deal with a real but overhyped
public evil--coerced prostitution--it quickly underwent a moralistic
interpretation that ignored the realities of human sexual behavior
and became a tool of aggressive prosecutors and even blackmailers.
Eventually outmoded by changing popular attitudes, it remained
unamended largely through political inertia and cowardice.

The facts are hardly disputable. In the early years of the twentieth
century, prostitution was an established feature of big-city life and
a subject of intense concern among the progressive-minded. Whether
the "fallen women" who sold their bodies were seen as wicked or
pitied as forced recruits to "vice" by reason of poverty, there was
agreement that the business itself was a threat to public decency and
(via venereal diseases) to public health. For puritans, social
reformers, and hygienists alike prostitution was a behavioral problem
that "could be controlled and changed through legislation" (p. 6).

Superimposed on relatively rational discussion of these issues was a
1907 to 1914 wave of hysteria about "white slavery," the alleged
practice of actually kidnapping young women and forcing them into
brothels. Sensationalized reports and lurid works of fiction,
including movies (then a novelty), told tales of country lasses and
immigrant maidens enticed off city streets, "pricked by poisoned
darts or hypodermic needles and then dragged off to dens of iniquity"
(p. 27). No girl, it appeared, was safe alone. The kingpins of the
business were alleged to be foreigners, part of a "far-flung, evil
syndicate." Reviewing recent studies, Langum finds more fancy than
fact in the "white slave" literature, but notes its connection to
swelling uneasiness about the bad effects of big cities, immigration,
and female independence on supposedly traditional American virtues.
He wisely refrains from belaboring the obvious then-and-now
similarities between that war on vice and the current one against
drugs. The parallels speak for themselves.

The key point is that the Mann Act itself was intended as a specific
response to forced sex-for-hire. It is actually titled "The White
Slave Traffic Act" and in part implemented United States adherence to
a 1904 international treaty on the subject. Introduced in June 1909
by Illinois congressman James R. Mann, chair of the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee, it sailed through both houses of
Congress with very little opposition, and that little on states'
rights grounds. Few legislators would risk being classed among
adversaries described by one advocate as "whoremongers . . . pimps .
. . procurers . . . all those who hate God and scoff at innocence and
laugh at female virtue" (p. 44). None, therefore, debated the
innocuous-sounding phrases in Section 2 that specified fines of up to
$5,000 or jail terms as long as five years for transporting in
interstate or foreign commerce or in the District of Columbia "any
woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for
any other immoral purpose, or with the intent " to "induce, entice,
or compel [her] to engage in any other immoral practice " (p. 261,
emphasis added).

It was precisely those phrases which, after the law took effect in
1910, were later used by the United States Supreme Court on reviewing
appeals from conviction to make the statute far more than a tool to
stamp out the commercial traffic in prostitutes. First came a
constitutional challenge to the act on the grounds that it allowed
the federal government to invade the states' police powers and also
struck at the right of free travel. The Court brushed aside these
contentions in Hoke v. U.S. (1913), claiming that such fundamental
rights as travel existed only for "beneficial exercise," and that the
power of the United States over interstate commerce was complete
enough to allow even for controls that "had the character of police
regulations" (p. 62-63).

A year later, in Wilson v. U.S., the Court read the statute even more
expansively. The defendants, a Chicago couple, had brought a pair of
adult and willing women from Milwaukee to work in their brothel, but
for some reason then refused to admit them. Hence, they claimed, the
immoral purpose underlying the transportation had not been executed.
No matter, opined the justices: the transportation coupled with the
mere intention, fulfilled or not, was sufficient to convict.

The hammer really fell with Caminetti v. U.S. (1917), a case with a
high media profile and political reverberations because the
defendant, Drew Caminetti, was the son of a prominent California
Democrat. Caminetti and a friend, both married men with children,
were having affairs with two independent young women aged nineteen
and twenty, and in March of 1913 took them by train from Sacramento
to Reno for a fling that ended abruptly with their arrest by police
set on the trail by the betrayed wives. Both men were tried and found
guilty. On appeal, their lawyer argued that the legislative history
of the statute clearly showed it to be leveled against
"commercialized vice," and that however immoral his clients' escapade
might be, it was "free from commercialism and coercion." But the
Court majority (including the civil libertarians Holmes and Brandeis)
refused to consider that claim. The plain language of the statute
should be followed, said the majority, without retrospectively
reading the lawmakers' minds. Never mind the act's title; its words
plainly proscribed interstate transportation for an "immoral
purpose," and in 1917 to decriminalize the conduct of the two men
"would shock the common understanding of what constitutes an immoral
purpose" (pp. 113-14).

Hence, before it was only a few years old, the Mann Act as read
judicially had a new meaning. The mere private, masculine intention
of "debauching" a woman to whom one was not wed, regardless of her
willingness--women were not free to choose--was a federal crime if
interstate travel was involved. "Don't even think about it" was
literally what the Court had decreed. Langum fairly points out that
the justices were more or less following, if not the election
returns, at least the expressed mood of the times, which drew no
sharp line between condemning sex-for-pay and sex-for-pleasure. As
the moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of
the USA put it, "the man who uses his wealth or influence to betray
young womanhood" is "no less a menace to society than the man who
directly commercializes . . . vice" (p. 70).

But chasing private violators quickly proved a boon to extortionists.
A would-be Don Juan on a bibulous night out could easily be lured by
a woman into crossing a state line, only to be confronted the next
morning with a demand that he pay up or be denounced to the nearest
federal attorney. Gangs of blackmailers allegedly squeezed their
victims for profits guessed to be as much as a million dollars a
year. Yet there was no drive to amend the law by specifically
exempting noncommercial sex from its reach.

Historical circumstance gave the Mann Act special force when the era
of reaction that spurred Prohibition, fundamentalism, and a resurgent
Ku Klux Klan followed hard on the heels of Caminetti. From 1920 to
1928 the government investigated noncommercial transgressors with
"ardent zeal," acting on thousands of letters "from neighbors, wives,
husbands, fathers, and busybodies" (p. 140). Langum declares that
several hundred annual convictions were the residue of thousands of
investigations and many prosecutions. He estimates that
"noncommercial cases dominated the thoughts and activities of the
federal morals police" (p. 155).

But the other side of the twenties, Jazz Age liberality, took some
steam out of the purity crusade after 1928 as juries became somewhat
more reluctant to convict. Despite shifts in manners and morals,
however, the Department of Justice never changed its decades-long
policy of pursuing noncommercial violators if they happened to be
"undesirables." Many people are aware that black heavyweight champion
Jack Johnson was found guilty under the Mann Act in 1913 for
transporting a white prostitute from Pittsburgh to Chicago for his
personal enjoyment. His true offense, however, lay in outraging
public sensibility by successive marriages to two white brides.
Forty-seven years later, even in the changed racial climate of 1960,
black rock and roll composer-performer Chuck Berry served twenty
months in jail on a Mann Act conviction, the punishment for his
admitted "fondness for women . . . of all colors" (p. 186). And
between those two cases fell the memorable indictment of Charlie
Chaplin in 1944, ostensibly on a Mann Act charge but in fact because
of his admitted sympathy for the Communist party and the Soviet Union
(with which we were then allied in war). J. Edgar Hoover had
personally instigated the prosecution--but the jury acquitted Chaplin.

Other selected targets over a half-century span included "Machine
Gun" Jack McGurn, an Al Capone hood (conviction reversed in 1932);
Isadore Blumenfeld a.k.a. "Kid Cann" and "Fergie Bloom" in the
Minneapolis underworld (convicted in 1960); a sometime Imperial
Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan and assorted gamblers, swindlers, and
other undesirables against whom some U.S. Attorney invoked the Mann
Act "on the theory that these were bad people and ought to be charged
with something" (p. 196).

Enforcement began a long decline, however, even before the "sexual
revolution" of the nineteen sixties and seventies. In several cases
between 1945 and 1959 new members of the Supreme Court began to show
signs of impatience with the Caminetti principle of pursuing
immorality and ignoring the commercial purpose of the law. In one
dissent from a decision based on a very narrow reading, liberal
Justice Frank Murphy denounced "another . . . tortured and grotesque
application" marring the law's "already unhappy history" (p. 210).
The Court never did overturn Caminetti, but as public opinion came to
tolerate more relaxed sexual standards, many appellate judges simply
bypassed it and effectively limited the act's reach by narrowing the
definition of "immoral purposes" to exclude such activities as
stripping or acting in pornographic films. And fewer cases reached
juries increasingly unlikely to be indignant. Convictions nationwide
dropped from 184 in 1959 to a mere 14 in 1980.

The act has never been repealed--it is still too politically
sensitive--but it has been modified. A 1978 amendment updated
definitions of "transportation" and targeted those who commercially
exploited minors of either sex by involving them in various forms of
specifically defined "prohibited sexual conduct." And in 1986, a
further tightening increased protection for minors and male victims,
and replaced the terms "debauchery" and "immoral purposes" with the
straightforward "any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense." But the act is still available to
prosecutors in certain limited circumstances and can be an instrument
of harassment. Old and widely forgotten or ignored where private
conduct is involved, it still has a tooth or two.

In summary, what Langum has done is to study the changing application
of a law in its social context, a procedure that dissolves boundaries
between legal and social history and other disciplines to the benefit
of them all. His story cuts across women's, urban, family, and
religious history, public opinion formation and its media
enhancement, and the legislative impact of ideological lobbies.
Proving the richness of a many-dimensional approach to a single
topic--especially when insights are unified by strong
narrative--Crossing Over the Line shows how good history can
illuminate public debate. Government has no business at all in
defining "sin," but if policymakers must perforce sometimes deal with
the social consequences of private behavior they would do far better
to consult factual works like this one than to listen to the gassy
platitudes of our current crop of moralizers."